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Abstract 
Common concepts of terrorism refer to acts which are intended to create a system of fear.  The ideo-
logical argument for terrorism relates to a politically and emotionally charged scenario in which ter-
rorism is necessary. The development of a terrorist organization requires an environment that is ripe 
with social degradation and has idealistic minded people who are able to believe in a cause. The or-
ganization utilizes a social system to maintain its own stability and to retain the people who are in-
volved within its self-contained community. Suffering oppression from its own government or an-
other nation is a crucial component in fostering the development of terrorist organizations. The sys-
tem of development is entrenched within the culture of a people who feel separated from the tradi-
tions and cultures of societal expectation. The perceived oppression is vital for creating blame for the 
current status of the surviving people. Furthermore, oppression allows for the development of hate 
to occur, which in turn creates a psychological opportunity to develop a terrorist narrative.  
This paper seeks to discuss how terrorist organizations like Hezbollah and Al Qaeda are developed 
around an oppressed society which has found its voice through aggression and violence. Their cause 
is said to be for the benefit of a societies which is enveloped into the ideological word of God.  Ter-
rorist organizations have targeted different types of nations for their continued existence; yet, these 
organizations still use the primary focuses of psychological influence of world view and prejudice 
theories to maintain their existence. In understanding terrorism, the characteristics of involvement 
must also be evaluated from a lens of world view understanding in combination of prejudice and psy-
chological theories.  
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Introduction  
The use of terror as a strategy for wielding power is as old an idea as power itself. For 
thousands of years, rulers have used terror as a tool to coerce others to comply with their de-
mands. Two recognizable examples of leaders who used terror as a governing tactic are Genghis 
Khan, leader of the fierce Mongol Horde, and Maximilian Robespierre, the leader and inspiration 
behind the Reign of Terror (1793-94), which occurred midway through the French Revolution. 
What exactly does it mean to use terror as a tool for power? For Khan and Robespierre, terror 
meant nothing more than to instill fear in others, or to refer back to the original Latin, “to make 
[them] tremble.” However, in today's political arena, the concept of terrorism is harder to define. 
The term terrorism is subjective; it has a variety of meanings to different groups of people 
(Merari, 2007). Governments, academics, and the media all define terrorism differently depending 
on the defining institutions purposes. What further complicates the definition of terrorism is that 
the term itself has become derogatory in its usage detracting from the notion of terrorism as 
simply a tool to achieve political ends (Merari, 2007).  In the academic community, there is a lack 
of consensus about how to define terrorism (Terrorism, 2008). Though there are a variety of 
working definitions regarding terrorism, for the purposes of this paper, when the term terrorism 
is used, it is in reference to a tool used by individuals or groups who are trying to achieve a politi-
cal or ideological outcome (Merari, 2007).  
Terrorist movements are as varied as academics’ definitions of terrorism. The two most 
common forms of terrorist movements are those focused on political terrorism and those that 
are based in religious fundamentalism; it is important to note that these two forms are not the 
same thing but often both religious and political aspirations are found within the same terrorist 
movement (Blin, 2007). Al Qaeda is a prime example of a terrorist movement that combines po-
litical aspirations with a distinct religious undertone in its methods and ideologies (Blin, 2007). 
For example, one of Al Qaeda’s primary goals is to destroy Israel and the United States, a goal 
that is both political and religious in nature (Blin, 2007). The governments of these two states are 
considered to be the antithesis of Al Qaeda’s beliefs; Al Qaeda is opposed to both of these states’ 
political democracy as well as their social and religious values which stem from their Judeo-
Christian foundations. Hezbollah is another example of an organization that combines religious 
and political motivations. Hezbollah considers itself the “Party of God” and operates under what 
it claims is a literal interpretation of the word of God. To that end the organization sees its mis-
sion as eliminating all non-Muslims from Muslim lands.  
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Through the execution of this mission, Hezbollah has moved from a guerrilla organization to a 
mainstream political organization (Harik, 2005). Through an examination of the theories of 
worldview and prejudice and by examining the psychology of terrorism, it becomes clear how 
through different methodologies Al Qaeda and Hezbollah have developed into successful organi-
zations. While the methods the groups use are different, they pull from the concepts of 
worldview and prejudice development to impact the psychology of their target populations and 
to successfully implement their missions and create terror in their enemies. 
 
Analysis of  a Terrorist Perspective: World View Perspective 
 
Worldview theory explains how and why people's perceptions and beliefs change over 
time. According to Docherty (2001), each culture has its own unique worldview; however, the act 
of developing worldviews and using them during decision making processes is universal. In un-
derstanding worldviews it is important that we recognize that worldviews are composed of four 
interrelated components: 1) ontology (our understanding about nature and our interrelatedness 
with the universe); 2) a theory of world order (our understanding and beliefs of what exists and 
how it is relative to the rest of the world); 3) axiology (an understanding of the universe based on 
how important some parts are in relationship to others); and 4) epistemology (philosophy about 
the extent we are able to know what exists in the world) (Docherty, 2001).  
 Worldviews are developed to assist individuals in garnering a basic understanding of the 
world and subsequently, a set of moral guidelines which can shape their actions (Heyleighen, 
2000; Docherty, 2001).  Because conflict is fluid, and because the social context of the conflict 
changes over time, worldview theory indicates that parties will constantly be in a process of sim-
ultaneously reevaluating, reshaping, and either reaffirming or redefining their own worldviews. 
For this reason, while an individual may be able to say this is what their worldview is currently, 
they cannot say for certain that this is what their worldview was before, this is what it is now, and 
this is what it will always be (Docherty, 2001).  
Telling and retelling of stories, primarily through the use of metaphors, is a large component in 
the development of worldviews, and a way that the worldviews of both old and young alike can 
be shaped by those in power. Metaphors themselves also contribute to worldview related conflict 
in at least three ways: 1) disagreements over the meanings of shared metaphors; 2) disputes over 
which metaphors apply to which situations; and 3) whether the metaphor is intended to be inter-
preted literally or figuratively (Docherty, 2001).  
  Journal of Interdisciplinary Conflict Science Vol. 1  Issue 1  July 2015 
62 
We see these three types of worldview-related conflicts frequently within any religiously driven 
conflict as each religion utilizes centuries old religious text which has been handed down genera-
tionally, more specifically in Judaism, Christianity and Islam, where believers continuously strug-
gle with which interpretations of religious texts are to be followed. The terrorist networks of 
Hezbollah and Al Qaeda clearly recognize this struggle for believers over interpretation, and have 
used this to their advantage and helped guide and shape worldviews to their advantage. While 
numerous authors have cited that ideology plays a minimal role in an individual's decision to be-
come a member of a terrorist organization (Horgan, 2009; Sageman, 2004, 2008; Bjorgo 2009), 
ideology is frequently used as a tool to create and perpetuate the worldviews held by the follow-
ers of the organizations. The terrorist organizations of Hezbollah and Al Qaeda, through narrow-
ly interpreted reification of Quranic texts, have both re-transmitted interpretations of Surah and 
Hadiths to firmly establish and reaffirm power and control.  
It should be noted that when groups enter into conflict scenarios with others who share 
the same worldviews, the process by which these worldviews are developed and maintained does 
not become a key factor in the conflict discourse (Docherty, 2001). Worldviews only become a 
factor when there are competing or conflicting worldviews (where differences can span from 
drastic to mild) and in situation in which worldview issues enter the forefront of the discourse 
(Docherty, 2001), such as is the case with the conflict between terrorist organizations and the 
Western World. In this situation, instead of working together toward developing a mutually bene-
ficial living environment where conflicts are addressed via positive means, the terrorist networks 
of Hezbollah and Al Qaeda use propaganda and story-telling to highlight the worldview differ-
ences between their followers and the Western World, which creates and reinforces an additional 
narrative: that of terrorism. The created narrative then becomes cyclical as those who accept it 
buy into the idea that all things “western” and rooted within capitalism are assaulting the basic 
ideological tenets of the religious faith that is being hijacked through this propaganda and story-
telling. Subsequently, they believe that death or annihilation are preferable to “losing” (with los-
ing meaning loss of religious identity). 
 In the minds of those who follow the teachings of the terrorist networks of Hezbollah 
and Al Qaeda, both the Surah and Hadiths are clear regarding what is to be seen as being against 
Islam and what is to be seen as an attack against Allah. There is no room for ambiguity. Alterna-
tively, there is no substantial evidence which proves beyond doubt what the intentions of these 
texts are, and the terrorist organizations of Hezbollah and Al Qaeda use this ambiguity to their 
benefit.  
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Followers of Hezbollah and Al Qaeda, in an attempt to remain in good graces with their God, 
must remain in a good relationship with the organizational leadership (who has dubbed them-
selves as the experts on religious doctrine and as a direct line to God). This allows the prejudices 
they have been established through the worldview process to cloud their religious interpretation, 
that strengthens a person’s resolve over time, and thus these worldviews are used to perpetuate 
prejudice.  
Prejudice 
Prejudice is one of the many potential outcomes of worldview building especially in reli-
giously and ethnic based conflict. Although many people use religion as a way to calibrate their 
individual moral compass, throughout history, religion is arguably one of the strongest tools to 
continue and perpetuate prejudice, hatred, and violence against certain groups within society. We 
must be clear to make the distinction though that prejudice does not come from religious doc-
trine itself, but rather from the religious leaders who read and interpret the doctrine and then use 
it for their ulterior motives.  
Gordon W. Allport  (1958) defines prejudice as an “aversive or hostile attitude toward a 
person who belongs to a group simply because he belongs to that group, and is therefore pre-
sumed to have the objectionable qualities ascribed to that group” (p. 9). However this is only a 
partial understanding of prejudice. More importantly, in order for a generalization or mispercep-
tion to be classified as prejudicial in nature, those who maintain views that are prejudicial must be 
resistant to changing those views even when there is evidence provided which undermines the 
original prejudicial views. It is never easy to determine how much information is required for a 
person to create a belief about others, but those with prejudicial views have a tendency to claim 
that they have enough information to have created and maintained those views over time 
(Allport, 1958), and thus become resistant to change.  Because we have already established that 
prejudice is learned and maintained through the world viewing process, it becomes clear that it is 
far easier for followers of Hezbollah and Al Qaeda to learn prejudice than it is for them to un-
learn. This is why terrorist organizations generally begin their indoctrination early, and it is be-
lieved that disenfranchised members of terrorist organizations may have high rates of recidivism, 
though more research is still needed (Morris, Eberhard, Rivera, & Watsula, 2010). 
According to Allport (1958), prejudice manifests along a broad range of actions which 
have been broken down into five categories which can all be seen in the terrorist organizations of 
Hezbollah and Al Qaeda.  
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These categories are: 1) anti-locution (where the person holding the prejudicial views expresses 
prejudicial beliefs with like-minded people); 2) avoidance (where the person holding the prejudi-
cial views  will choose to not interact with the person that they hold the views about); 3) discrimi-
nation (where the person holding the prejudicial views will take steps to actively exclude the sub-
ject of their prejudicial views); 4) physical attack (where the person holding the prejudicial views 
will use violence or semi-violence towards the subject of their prejudicial views); and 5) extermi-
nation (where the person holding the prejudicial views takes steps to actively remove the subject 
of their prejudicial views from the face of the earth).  
 Entity theory is closely related to prejudice as it relates to intractable conflict and speaks 
to the way that humans view one another. Entity theory can be used to both reinforce prejudices 
and worldviews as well as be reinforced by prejudices and worldviews. In entity theory, people 
are said to have innate qualities about them such as compassion or morality, and this is unchang-
ing and fixed over time (Dweck & Ehrlinger, 2006). Entity theory and prejudice theory serve the 
purpose to explaining how, as they become more entrenched in following the teachings of the 
terrorist organization, members isolate themselves from those who may have different beliefs, 
morals, and values. In essence, people begin to isolate themselves from others who have differing 
views, and they fail to modify their views when confronted with evidence that suggests that they 
may not have made an appropriate initial assessment (Allport, 1958; Dweck & Ehrlinger, 2006). 
This isolation  sets the stage for a stronger us vs. them dichotomy facilitated by an ease with 
which people on opposing sides of the conflict become quick to label those with opposing views 
as being overall immoral, evil or bad based entirely on the evidence that is presented. 
Characteristics of  Terrorism  
The process of worldview building and developing prejudice through that worldview 
building informs the characteristics of terrorist groups. Within the study of terrorism and terrorist 
movements, it is important to take note of some defining characteristics of terrorism; these char-
acteristics allows for the delineation between terrorist activity, conventional warfare, and guerilla 
tactics. Table 1 highlights the differences between Terrorism, Guerilla War and Conventional 
War (Merari, 2007). 
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Table 1 Characteristics of  Terrorism, Guerrilla War, and Conventional War as Modes of  Violent Struggle_________ 
          Conventional War   Guerrilla War    Terrorism 
 
Unit size in battle   Large (armies, corps, divisions) Medium (platoons, companies, Small  (usually fewer than ten 
         battalions)      persons) 
 
Weapons   Full range of  military hardware Mostly infantry-type light  Hand guns, hand grnades,  
   (air force, armor, artillery, etc.) weapons but sometimes artillery assault rifles, and special
          ized pieces as well weap
          ons (e.g., car bombs,    
          remote- control bombs,  
          barometric pressure  
          bombs) 
 
Tactics   Usually joint operations involving  Commando-type    Specialized: kidnapping,  
several military branches      assassinations, car bomb
         ing, hijacking, barricade - 
         hostage etc. 
 
Targets   Mostly military units, industrial Mostly military, police, and  State symbols, political  
and transportation infrastructure administration staff, as well  opponents, and the public 
     as political opponents  at large 
 
Intended impact  Physical destruction    Mainly physical attrition of  the Psychological coercion 
enemy 
 
Control of  territory  Yes     Yes     No 
 
Uniform     Wear uniform    Often wear uniform   Do not wear uniform 
 
Recognition of  war    War limited to recognized   War limited to the country in  No recognized war zones; 
Zones geographical area    strife      operations carried out  
          worldwide 
 
International legality    Yes, if  conducted by rules   Yes, if  conducted by rules   No 
 
 
As seen in Table 1, terrorism is quite different from other methods of warfare in many distinct 
areas. One important distinction is that terrorists do not seek to acquire or control a physical ter-
ritorial space; one of the defining characteristics of traditional warfare is that it is usually centered 
on some form of territorial acquisition (Merari, 2007).  
Domestic legality      Yes     No     No 
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Because terrorists do not usually operate out of a specified territorial base, they tend to immerse 
themselves within a small community. This causes them to operate in small units in order to 
maintain their anonymity and security, rather than conducting affairs in the corps or battalions of 
the military. Further, although terrorists may use military type weapons such as sniper rifles and 
grenades, they also will use anything at their disposal in order to achieve their overall goal. Ter-
rorists will use car bombs, remote detonated devices, chemical gas, etc. The goal for these terror-
ists in their choice of weapon is to cause not only damage, but also to cause anxiety, fear, and 
panic. This is the primary tactic of terrorist organizations overall; their primary strategy is to exert 
psychological influence on a population (Merari, 2007). The psychological element of terrorism is 
discussed in depth in the next section. Where conventional and guerrilla warfare focus on the tra-
ditional, honorable rules of modern warfare, terrorists do not hesitate to step outside of these 
boundaries and use whatever strategy or tactic will help them to accomplish what they are after.  
Differences between conventional warfare, guerrilla warfare and terrorism would be in-
complete without a discussion of the morality concept for these three types of warfare. Conven-
tional warfare is traditionally considered to be more “moral” and “humane” as it is conducted 
within certain parameters of actions that are considered acceptable, and theoretically avoiding 
using methods that are deemed unacceptable or immoral (Cornell University Law School). Con-
ventional warfare is bound by the terms of the 1949 Geneva Convention which prohibits certain 
actions during wartime; these include but are not limited to granting wounded soldiers access to 
medical care, protecting medical personnel including hospital ships, affording humane and proper 
treatment to prisoners of war, prohibiting the use of torture to gain access to information from 
prisoners of war, and protecting civilians from inhumane treatment and attack (Cornell Universi-
ty Law School). The terms of the Geneva Convention bind the nations which are party to the 
Convention to these specific rules of warfare. The limitation of the Geneva Convention is that 
not all nations have agreed to the terms of the protocols; and further, terrorist movements (as 
organizations rather than nations) are not bound by the Geneva Convention or any other code of 
conduct for warfare.  
Terrorist organizations operate under an entirely different set of guidelines that are 
shaped by culture, political, and religious ideology, and are not bound by other nations’ defini-
tions of moral and immoral actions (Jenkins, 2006). Terrorism is a form of violence which shat-
ters the war convention and the traditional political code (Walzer, 2006). In attempting to define 
terrorism with one sole purpose belittles the ideology that is associated within the environment of 
what terrorism is. The characteristics of what is terrorism has changed over the centuries.  
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Effectively defining the characteristics of terrorism lies within the original definition of terrorism. 
The word ‘terrorism’ was originally described as the “systematic order of terror” which was uti-
lized to rule the reluctant citizenry of 18th century France (Roberts, 2006). In the more recent 
history of terrorism, the evolution of terrorist characteristics have evolved. There is a less uni-
formly defined concept of what an act of terrorism may be, and that is the “systematic use of fear 
and criminal activity to achieve goals or objectives that a specific organization has 
planned” (Razzak, 2003). As a group, the network of terrorism works. Yet when considering that 
inside the group, the people consider themselves to be freedom fighters. Which is why there is a 
need for understanding that a primary characteristic of terrorism is ground within the field of 
psychology. The field of psychology considers that the concept of terrorism is more of a group 
dynamic need which allows for the universal psychological processes to take shape. The uncon-
scious fear of death is removed when the concept of personal significance is guided toward a per-
son who is a member of the terrorist organization (DeAngelis, November 2009). 
 Considering that there is significant violence that may occur from a terrorist act, there is a 
belief that the people committing the violence are doing so due to them being brainwashed. Alt-
hough this concept has an aspect of reality outside of the terrorist culture, within there is a life-
style for which the people participating believe. Horgan (2009) stated that people become more 
involved in terrorist networks due to the ease of acceptance. Utilizing group dynamics, becoming 
part of a terrorist network makes sense. As each individual joins the network for their own pro-
gressive reason, they are systematically integrated into the network to allow for growth and devel-
opment. The network is then able to grow as an organization which has needs. The needs sur-
rounding a terrorist network are guided by ideals and violence (Horgan, 2009). 
 Political leaders are required to follow a specific set of rules, which are guided by the peo-
ple and accepted by the mass population. The differentiation between a political environment 
within a State and terrorism is that the leaders of a terrorist network exist within a political envi-
ronment, yet, do not follow the internal rules structure. What hinders a society’s leadership is the 
same freedom that terrorist networks are able to enjoy. Further, terrorist networks are not main-
tained internationally by treatise, rules or structure. Rather they operate outside of the interna-
tional spectrum allowing for their own rule to occur. This rule may include violence within their 
own State or toward other States who are seen as the aggressors (Pittel & Rubbelke, 2009).  
Terrorism is not the only form of violence that occurs outside of the internationally accepted 
rules of war, but it is the most frequently used form of violence that falls outside of these accept-
ed rules of war (Merari, 2007).  
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Because terrorists target non-combatants and civilians specifically, and because they frequently 
kill civilians through their methods (which steps outside of Walzer’s morality litmus test for ter-
rorists), terrorism can correctly be characterized as an illegal and unacceptable form of warfare 
for its consistent and blatant breaking of the moral standards in warfare (Merari, 2007). However, 
one element of the morality issue that needs to be reiterated is that terrorists do not follow the 
guidelines of morality as outlined by their enemies; instead they create their own morals and val-
ues. Terrorists also do not wage war according to the internationally accepted rules of warfare of 
their enemies, but they wage war by their own standards (Merari, 2007).  
Terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda and Hezbollah use their own standards of mo-
rality to maximize the amount of psychological impact over the communities they desire to influ-
ence. This psychological impact is the terrorists’ primary strategy that they employ against a pop-
ulation. By operating outside of the internationally accepted standards of warfare, they cause fear 
among the targeted populations, as civilians never have the feeling that they are safe or that they 
will be protected as non-combatants (Merari, 2007). Civilians never know where or when to ex-
pect that an attack might occur and organizations such as Al Qaeda and Hezbollah use this to 
their advantage in controlling the psyche of those they wish to target.  
Though this psychological element is the primary (and the most essential) strategy terror-
ist organizations use, there are five smaller strategies that are used which support the larger goal 
of psychological impact which Ariel Merari (2007) refers to as the essentials of the psychological 
impact. The first of these strategies is called propaganda by deed (Merari, 2007), where terrorists 
commit deeds which will ensure massive media coverage (such as car bombings) that kill the larg-
est number possible. They then propagandize the media response to further disseminate a mes-
sage of fear throughout the population; endless images being shown on news reports and in 
newspapers ensure that the deeds stay on the minds of every person with relatively easy access. 
The media coverage helps the terrorist organization achieve the shock value it was looking for 
(Merari, 2007).  
According to Merari (2007), a second act that terrorists use in gaining psychological im-
pact is that of intimidation. In some instances the terrorist organization needs to coerce a large 
population in a short amount of time, and so it uses the strategy of intimidation to make that 
happen. Usually intimidation works when a high-ranking authority such as a government official 
or a judge is kidnapped and the terrorist organization threatens violence in the form of torture, 
maiming or assassination (Merari, 2007).  
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The threats and intimidation is not just for the ones that were kidnapped; these threats are de-
signed to bring the entire population to its knees as the second part of the intimidation technique 
is the promise of violence against all those that were in support of the person kidnapped and 
their failed policies (Merari, 2007). Furthermore, this sends the message that any part of the pop-
ulation that had been neutral on a decision will now be inclined to give the terrorists what they 
are after, rather than see violence enacted against the community.  
Within the terrorist organizations, it is important for the terrorists to gain public support 
for their actions against the government. Without the support of the population, violence could 
unite the community with the government against the terrorist organization, rather than draw 
support which supports the ideals being sought by the terrorist organization. The terrorist organi-
zation requires an action by the government that they deem unacceptable, so the terrorist organi-
zation is justified in a violent response, and they can validate their behavior with their supporters 
as little more than a defensive tactic. The third act of terrorism is the act of provocation. The de-
sign is to create or develop an action that provokes the government to respond with some reac-
tion that forces the public to view the terrorist organization as the abuser. Provocation forces the 
government to become the abuser in retaliation (Merrari, 2007). The organization then has the 
legitimacy it needs to respond with increased violence against the government; it is at this point 
that the organization wants to gain the support of the community in its rampage against the gov-
ernment. By provoking the government to act, the community becomes further incensed by the 
repression the government responds toward the terrorist organizations with, and this bolsters 
sympathy toward the goals of the terrorist organizations (Merari, 2007). The community may 
even begin to view the organization as freedom fighters, rather than as terrorists, which has a sig-
nificant impact on the organization’s ability to affect some type of change.  
Provocation is just one way terrorist organizations seek to demonstrate the fallacies with-
in the government. The strategy of promoting chaos is also designed to demonstrate to the popu-
lation that the government is ill equipped to deal with large-scale disaster if the terrorist organiza-
tions display the government’s inability, this garners additional support from the population for 
the idea and promotion of the removal of the government authorities in charge. The terrorists 
implement a strategy of creating chaos on a large scale, they then use the slow and frequently in-
effective government response to push forth a change in regime based on the current govern-
ment’s ineffectiveness in dealing with the problems that plague the population (Merari, 2007).  
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This strategy works best for the organization if the general population is not aware of who is 
causing the chaos in the first place, and can be a delicate balance to manage, one where the  ter-
rorist organization: 1) needs the sympathy of the community in acting out against the govern-
ment; 2) must gain this sympathy while causing doubt in the effectiveness of the government it is 
fighting against; and 3) must do this without turning the community against the efforts of the ter-
rorists themselves. The strategy of chaos is an attempt to further influence the mood of the pub-
lic in their favor so that they may continue (without hindrance) their struggle against the govern-
ment (Merari, 2007).  
 The political motivation of a terrorist organization is rarely known outside of the 
organization. The internal government focuses on governing the people and when a terrorist net-
work is known within its borders, the goal should be to remove the organization at all costs. At 
times, a terrorist organization can develop itself as a freedom opportunity against other, outside 
governments who are causing internal degradation. Other times the terrorist organization devel-
ops to guide the people against its own government. An example of this is Hezbollah, who fo-
cused its political aggression toward Israel because the homeland was not taking care of the prob-
lem. In this instance the organization will utilize the host nation as part of the problem so that it 
can hold out against the resolve of the government (Kegley, 2002). 
In some cases, terrorist organizations attempt to wear out the resolve of the governments they 
are fighting against regarding less important issues in order to face decreased resistance when the 
organization fights against the government regarding what they have deemed to be more im-
portant issues. This is known as the strategy of attrition, and it is quite common in all forms of 
warfare (Merari, 2007). Wearing down the enemy to exhaustion in order to launch a final offen-
sive is not a new idea; what is new about the idea is removing it from the files of conventional 
war tactics and its implementation by terrorist organizations to be used against the government. 
With any response to a terrorist activity, the government must weigh the economic, political, and 
social costs of the response; the organization hopes that the government will decide the cost is 
too high in minor issues, and thus, they will not fight back with the same stamina the terrorist 
organization has shown (Merari, 2007). The strategy of attrition aims to wear down not only the 
resolve of the government to fight back, but also to wear down its resources which will then hurt 
the ability of the government to respond when the organization begins its fight for their primary 
issue.  
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These five techniques that terrorist organizations use are just some of the techniques used 
to instill fear within the general population and amongst government officials. In discussing each 
of these five techniques, it is important to remember that the purpose of each one is to support 
the larger goal of psychological influence over the population.  These five techniques are general 
outlines, and organizations such as Hezbollah and Al Qaeda have used these techniques as well as 
others in their fight against their enemies. Ultimately, the primary goal is psychological influence, 
and terrorist will use whatever techniques are at their disposal in order to cause the greatest 
amount of paralyzing fear possible.  
Psychology of  Terrorism 
 The image that is conjured within society when the word terrorist is uttered is of an indi-
vidual that causes fear, abuse, and violence. When considering what it takes to become a terrorist, 
many individuals may believe that persons considered terrorists are filled with a specific psychop-
athy. Post (2007) suggests that people tend to believe that terrorists are fanatics who are out to 
gain power or precedence through their chosen obsessions.  The idea of a normal individual who 
chooses to become a terrorist does not fit with the everyday conceptualization of the psychology 
of a terrorist, yet the research shows that people who choose to commit many of the terrorist 
based atrocities within society have a normal functioning brain. The people who are involved as 
terrorist and are in fact no different than the people who are reading this article (Horgan, 2005 & 
Post, 2007). Through interviews Horgan (2005) analyzed people who are known to be involved 
as terrorists and came to the conclusion that each of these people are to be considered normal 
from all natural or psychological standards.  Developing a clearer picture of what occurs within 
an individual’s mind may be close to impossible; yet, through the analysis of quality evaluation, 
researchers are better able to explain exactly what factors are at play in an individual’s develop-
ment into a terrorist. The primary factor that can be established to explain a young terrorist is a 
person of youth who has an inferiority complex (Horgan, 2005). 
Borum (2007) considered various means in which an individual would choose to be part 
of a terrorist network.  Joining a terrorist network is a conscious decision which is developed 
through a socially constructed environment.  This environment is typically found among people 
who are average or above average in terms of educational and socio-economic backgrounds. Bo-
rum’s research shows that people who are of lower socioeconomic status tend to react more 
quickly and offer more political violence such as riots rather than specific targeted terrorism. Fur-
ther, an individual network is more apt to be developed within a society that is surrounded by a 
poverty environment, yet it is not developed or created by the poor (Borum, 2007).  
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People of higher socioeconomic means begin to develop their network by bringing an 
environment of comfort to a small group of people at a time. The people that are targeted tend 
to be people of little or no education who are seeking a cause to believe in, and find reason to 
believe the people who are coming to them have a purpose that will bring them to a better place. 
Poverty is not the cause of terrorism, yet it is a necessary aspect in recruitment of future partici-
pants. This poverty is also an important factor in developing a reason to find cause of angst to-
ward the aggressor. Inevitably, recruitment can only occur if the people that are being recruited 
feel that their purpose can be met, and that their angst toward a perpetrator can be rectified 
(Post, 2007).  
Recruitment through social construction 
Considering the power of a terrorist network, alongside the validity of a cause, the theo-
retical construct of social construction can be utilized to explain why and how an individual may 
see a terrorist network working toward their benefit rather than an environment of evil (Post, 
2007).  The theory of social construction is a concept that is focused on the dependence of con-
tingent variables which are facilitated within our social selves. These different social selves are 
constructed through various underlying assumptions that an individual is a combination of their 
reality, knowledge and learned environment (Beaumie, 2006). When considering how social con-
struction facilitates the development of the terrorist narrative within the realm of terrorist devel-
opment and/or recruitment, the goal is not to offer a truthful representation of the landscape, 
rather the role of the controlling recruiter is to develop a conscious redirected toward an altered 
truth (Borum, 2007). In order to develop an altered truth in recruiting people into a network, the 
environment needs to have been deconstructed politically. Further the political deconstruction 
needs to leave behind at least one nation state or religious organization for the blame of circum-
stance (Blanford, 2011). For a terrorist network to continue its recruitment, then it needs to 
maintain its skills in recruitment. Prior to creating a recruitment team, the network leaders need 
to develop an environment in which they can convert individuals. This conversion is enabled 
through the system of social construction (Turk, 2008). The leaders develop a hierarchy which 
allows for them to recruit through an individual means. The strategic logic behind individual re-
cruitment allows for the network to build a narrative for a small group toward recruitment rather 
than try and recruit the whole village at one time (Pape, 2006).   
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In seeking recruitment of new members to join a terrorist network, the strategy is to seek 
out people who are knowingly unhappy with the political enemy and can be taught why the cause 
is of value. A primary goal that is able to be shared between a recruiter and a recruit is that of fu-
ture success. The understanding of group dynamics is that an individual alone is not enough to 
destroy the enemy; therefore the building of a network is deemed a necessity. This process is not 
a short or easy transition, yet the more an organization gains international acclaim the easier it is 
for a network to recruit new people (Pape, 2006). Exposures to the ideologies which justify ter-
rorism are a crucial aspect in maintaining recruitment. The recruiters continue to educate the sur-
rounding people in reference to the behaviors of the non-committed versus the ideologies of a 
possible perfect future, frequently through the worldviewing process. With this education in 
mind, the recruiters develop an argument of, ‘if only they were not here, all would be per-
fect’ (Turk, 2008), which in turn fosters an increase in prejudice and escalates the cycle of indoc-
trination.  
  In the discussion of what helps to create or develop a terrorist, one of the most im-
portant mind altering techniques is the use of a collective identity. The goal is to be able to devel-
op a social psychology of internal networks to help and envelop an individual into the collective 
so that any sub groups or alternate options are no longer viable. This ability gives the leaders of 
these organizations sole control over a person who moves from outsider to recruit, then finally 
toward member. Being part of the inner sanctum is desired by all, but is a reward only offered as 
part of membership, and is only bestowed on  only a few of the people involved (Post 2007).  
Recruitment of members into Hezbollah.  
 Terrorist networks may have a well-defined and developed model in which to seek out 
new recruits. Yet each network has a purpose it can use as a cause for recruitment. Two of the 
most successful networks in recruitment are Hezbollah and Al Qaeda. Post (2007) describes how 
the history of Hezbollah is filled with circumstances that allowed for people in positions of pow-
er to use the development of an altered worldview to advance the role for the Shi’ite people. The 
socio-political environment within Libya was disastrous enough that very little tugging was need-
ed to show the people there could be another way.   
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The history of Hezbollah may be able to be traced back to Musa al-Sadr who developed 
the groundwork for development and recruitment of a new religious sect. In his commentary, he 
stated:: 
Today we shout out loud the wrongs against us, that cloud of injustice that has followed 
us since the beginning of our history. Starting from today, we will no longer complain or 
cry. Our name is not mitwaldi. Our name is “men of refusal,” “Men of vengeance,” “Men 
who revolt against all tyranny,” even though this costs us our blood and our lives. – Musa 
al-Sadr   (Wright, 1985, p. 58) 
This theme may sound similar to the context spoken by Hitler in Munich. When creating 
a fanatical system and sharing with the people that they will be needed to advance a cause, there 
has to be a certain aggressive emotion involved. The mentality of the youth movement (a primary 
component of Hezbollah’s recruitment) is developed through an understanding that their station 
in life is due to a government who does not care combined with a neighbor who will attack at any 
time (Post, 2007).  “The neighbor that may attack” is a primary recruiting tool for a terrorist net-
work such as Hezbollah who target Israel for their religious beliefs, and for their mere existence.  
The Shi'ite people then internalize this further and take the stance that Israel and its religion need 
to be exterminated. The people of Hezbollah believe strongly that their own religion is the only 
valid option and that anyone infringing on this religion is causing a societal abnormality 
(Blanford, 2011). 
Blanford (2011) shares how according to the worldviews of Hezbollah, Israel was part of 
the problem and needed to be removed from the map. The Iranians that were sent to remove the 
problem of the Israeli forces in the South were met with trepidation from the local people, as 
they did not see Israel as a threat. Over a period of time the area of Bekaa became a religious 
mecca. The original intent of the forces was to remove the Israeli threat and to develop an aware-
ness of the religious value. Slowly, yet certainly as part of the strategy, the guards integrated into 
the societal fabric and along with other people that arrived from Iran came to develop a city with-
in the area of Bekaa. Clerics had arrived as the transformation of the original location became 
altered to look like and resemble a city that was approved by the Khomeini. Further, the clerics 
took away many of the pleasures people had and altered the environment to teach the Koran and 
Khomeini’s theories of Islam. These changes led to the development of Hezbollah and soon to 
the recruitment of future Hezbollah members (Blanford, 2011).   
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The Sheik and his clerics worked to draw on the Quran to aide them in facilitating an ave-
nue for developing strength. This use was designed specifically to bring into question the inten-
tions of Israel and the Jewish people. The meaning of Hezbollah is the “Party of God,” which in 
essence was a strong contradiction to the Jewish notion of one God (Post, 2007). The further use 
of developing the name Hezbollah lead to an intense anti-Israeli sentiment which allowed for the 
people in the village to believe that what they were doing is what is best for Lebanon. The more 
that Hezbollah dehumanized Israel the easier it was to find recruits willing to participate in the 
movement (Post, 2007).  
Saad-Ghorayeb (2002) further demonstrates how Hezbollah was able to help guide the 
people who were thought of as second class citizens in their own land. Hezbollah wrote publicly 
how they are the first party to oppose deprivation of the impoverished, the first party to be a 
champion of the peasants and the farmers, the laborers and the poor, the oppressed and the de-
prived, the workers and the homeless. With the economy in decline and the people needing a 
leader to come and help rescue them, Hezbollah had an opportunity to recruit through social de-
velopment and humanistic welfare (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002). Hezbollah understood that the peo-
ple’s resentment toward the Lebanese government was a system in which they could develop fer-
tile radicalism for their cause (Post, 2007).  
The people of Baalbek were being drafted into the nation of Hezbollah in a swift yet re-
spectful manner. In an interview with one of the members, Post (2007) references a quote from 
Hamza akl Hamieh: 
From an early age, I used to go to pray in the Mosques. I later volunteered for the Amal 
youth movement, where I underwent early training, which helped me mature and reach 
the state of mind in which I eventually joined Hezbollah. In those lessons we were taught 
the unique nature of our religion and that the Ashura distinguishes us from other streams 
of Islam. In the lessons on religion and customs, I began to feel the revolutionary atmos-
phere…” (p. 164) 
This commentary is symbolic in that it is very close to the same manner in which Hitler 
was able to develop many recruits. As youths, people are more susceptible to belief and conver-
sion. Hezbollah was a well-developed group that began through infiltrating villages through the 
promise of a better life. They then branched out through the religious clergy by showing the peo-
ple what a better life looked like, all the while sharing their young students with the clerics.  
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As a good nature organization, Hezbollah was also deeply involved in the social service aspect of 
its network, remaining actively involved in charities, humanitarian efforts, and other social work. 
Each of these situations allows for Hezbollah to recruit new members and to train them along-
side the youth in order to develop a stronger more indentured network (Post, 2007).  
Hezbollah continues to offer its social aide to the community through financial grants 
and educational loans which are offered to a person or groups of people to be able to attend 
higher educational schools. According to Hala (1997), these people return to Hezbollah after 
completing their education, and become an integral part of the organization through becoming 
officers.  
Hezbollah has a strong internal structure that works to maintain itself through metamor-
phosis. Rather than simply remaining an outside force working for the benefit of Lebanon, Hez-
bollah joined the mainstream political environment. Slowly Hezbollah has been gaining power 
through the political spectrum which allows for it to recruit people more easily. Since its incep-
tion Hezbollah has built itself into a network that internally seeks to build a better Shi’ite people 
and on the outside is working to remove infidels that differentiate the Islamic religion (Addis & 
Blanchard, 2011). 
Recruitment into Al Qaeda.  
     Al-Qaeda offers a different type of terrorist network and helps to elucidate the differ-
ences between terrorist networks and methodologies. Post (2007) wrote how Osama Bin Laden, 
the former leader of Al Qaeda, was an educated man who developed a vision for a better Islamic 
nation after the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union. Although Bin Laden is credited 
with the development of Al Qaeda, it was another leader who used the charisma and leadership 
of Bin Laden to develop the theory of imprisonment. Abdullah Azam was Bin Laden's mentor 
while in college, and it was Azam that showed Bin Laden the vision for what was to become Al 
Qaeda. The focus began through recruitment. The original recruiting strategy was a worldwide 
effort to remove the “Godless Soviet Union.” This strategy may seem very open and wide 
spread, yet the original idea was also a tactic to view the desire for a militant wing. As the people 
received the news of a new militant style network, the more they viewed their world position as a 
negative one and wanted to force change. The outreach of the original recruitment request man-
aged to secure 5000 people from Saudi Arabia, 3000 from Algeria and 2000 from Egypt. This 
group became known as the Afghan Arabs and started as the nucleus of the Al Qaeda network 
(Post, 2007). 
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An intriguing portion of the Al Qaeda development is its use of the Quran as a dominant 
discourse for recruitment. The Quran states that “Allah favors the weak and the underdog,” 
which is why Afghanistan (with American financial Aid) was able to defeat the Soviets. Ultimately 
this sent the message that God is on the side of the weak, and will remain so. This is a very sim-
ple template, yet it is the foundation with which Al Qaeda uses to recruit new members. Al 
Qaeda is a network that is steeped within religion and utilizes the Quran as the focal point of its 
development. This connection is what allows for the recruitment process to spread out of imme-
diate communities to allow for cluster cells to be developed.  
The founder of Al Qaeda, (Osama Bin Laden) worked diligently to develop a system 
which allows for recruiters to seek out people who are willing to adopt a new religion which is 
focused on Islamic fundamentalist beliefs. These beliefs are adapted so that recruits can under-
stand the basic principles yet further understand that the threat for Al Qaeda is from the industri-
alized western nations and from non-believers. A common system of recruitment is within pris-
ons or areas of lower socioeconomic status (Gerwehr & Daly, 2006). As time moved forward, Al 
Qaeda continued to modify their recruitment strategies, and leadership quickly found that by be-
coming a global terrorist network Al Qaeda was afforded the opportunity to expand their version 
of Islam. The term Jihad, which had previously been understood my Muslims to mean an internal 
and personal struggle of the self, was redefined by Al Qaeda to mean  a Holy War, where people 
fight (literally) in the name of Allah.  
Operative cells within Al Qaeda work in tandem toward maintaining their mission. When 
recruiting new members, a primary model allows for a new cell to maintain the premise, yet it is 
not imperative to operate as an absolute. The concept within Al Qaeda is that they have a sus-
tainable model and allow for cells to develop around the model so that each is able to achieve a 
primary goal of destroying the infidels. The core of Al Qaeda is maintained while the outside is 
more fluidly developing. To many it may seem as if outreach has little or no coordination, yet, 
Osama Bin laden realized from the beginning that in order to spread the word of Al Qaeda and 
to develop a network of people that are terrorists, each operative unit needed to be allowed to 
metamorphose itself rather than be controlled with an iron fist (Byman, 2010).  
 
Why Terrorism Works 
The development of a terrorist organization requires an environment that is ripe with so-
cial degradation and has idealistic minded people who are able to believe in a cause (Coles, 2010). 
Suffering oppression from its own government or another nation is a crucial component in fos-
tering the development of terrorist organizations.  
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The oppression is vital for creating blame for the current status of the surviving people. Further-
more, oppression allows for the development of hate to occur, which in turn creates a psycholog-
ical opportunity to develop a terrorist narrative (Coles, 2010).  
 Blanford (2011) discusses that the history of Hezbollah and Al Qaeda are devel-
oped around an oppressed society which has found its voice through aggression and violence. 
Their cause is said to be for the benefit of a society which is enveloped into the ideological word 
of God.  Both organizations have targeted different types of nations for their continued exist-
ence; yet, these organizations still use the same methods to maintain their existence. For example, 
the image to the people is that both organizations employ bottom up organizational structures in 
order to address the needs of the people. The administrative environment of both organizations 
is top down from a power perspective, yet maintains an image of transformational power 
(bottom up) (Blanford 2011). 
The type of hostile environment that needs to be developed for a terrorist organization to 
operate requires considerable psychological experience. The types of people that are able to cre-
ate a terrorist organization simultaneously work toward developing their own culture. They do 
this through social construction, developing a community through a new language, religion, and a 
common philosophy (Gergen, 1999). This shared language, religion, and philosophy serve to oth-
erize and further alienate groups which are the targets of terrorist activities, a process which is 
compounded by a strengthening of worldviews. 
 A major component of world viewing is narrative, and within this context, terrorism be-
comes a narrative all of its own primarily because terrorism does not accept “losing” as a viable 
option and see death or annihilation as preferable to defeat. The group themselves is part of the 
population and not part of the government which allows for them to maintain their own rules. 
The ideology of terrorism is to be able to create systemic change for the population and to be 
able to sustain this system of fear. The fear that is being elicited develops an unconscious hatred 
toward the targeted group and allows for the terrorist group to solidify its cause by manipulating 
its followers (Turk, 2008).  
Conclusion 
While the definition of terrorism is a hotly debated topic among academics, politicians, 
and the general public, there is no question that terrorist organizations operate outside the 
“accepted” rules of war and seek to gain political and social ground by striking terror in the hearts 
of their enemies.  
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Since the rise in terrorist attacks aimed at the Western world, scholars have tried to determine the 
profile of a terrorist and to dissect how terrorism works. Pape (2006) made it clear that a terrorist 
isn’t much different than any other person, and cannot be defined by social, economic, or educa-
tional status. This unclear picture of a terrorist then leaves the world wondering how terrorist 
organizations are able to form and be successful. Byman (2003) noted that Al Qaeda is one of the 
most formidable terrorist groups the United States has ever encountered and has left policy mak-
ers questioning how to counteract such a well formed and entrenched group. Hezbollah has also 
proven itself to be a well formed group especially following its victories in democratic elections.  
Al Qaeda and Hezbollah are prime examples of how worldviewing and prejudice create a 
psychological situation that allows for the development of a terrorist organization. Both organiza-
tions have developed worldviews that enable a feeling of being wronged and righteousness that 
empower its members to feel a deep prejudice against their enemies. At the same time their 
worldviewing seeps into the fabric of their societies making recruitment an easier task because 
members of the target recruitment population see the terrorist organizations as representing their 
fundamental rights and interests. This tactic can be seen in the strategies of both organizations. 
As discussed in the characteristics of terrorism, terrorist groups often begin by infiltrating a small 
community. This can help spread the point of view of the organization by spreading through a 
small, contained social structure before branching out. By developing prejudice against non-
Muslims and the West, the organizations can create a sense of rightness in possible recruits and 
can mobilize them through the worldview that God is on their side.    
It is only through a marriage of worldview building, prejudice creation, and psychological 
reasoning that terrorist organizations can operate. Each of these facets of terrorist development 
help to reinforce the othering and build a complete justification for terrorism in the mind of ter-
rorists. The developed worldview helps reinforce the prejudice which develops out of the psy-
chological mindset of a population, and in a cyclical nature, then bolsters the worldviews and 
prejudice again. To non-terrorists, it seems that a logical person wouldn’t engage in terrorism, but 
by understanding that terrorism doesn’t occur in a vacuum but rather through the careful crafting 
of a point of view that supports a terrorist organization, membership in a terrorist group is easier 
to understand. The careful indoctrination and recruitment process that both Al Qaeda and Hez-
bollah demonstrate and show the indoctrination process that builds to actual acts of terrorism. 
Both of these groups have developed a prejudice against the Western Nations and Israel and oth-
ered its enemies by crafting a purpose that supports its mission such as the elimination of Israel 
or the expulsion of Western culture.  
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As Byman (2003) points out, it is through understanding not only the terrorist organizations but 
also its members that policies can be developed to counteract terrorism. It is clear that Al Qaeda 
and Hezbollah have developed a clear worldview that incorporated deep religious conviction cou-
pled with prejudice to develop broad organizations that have infiltrated the mainstream in their 
respective societies. Through this complete psychology of worldview development and prejudice, 
both organizations have become entrenched and formidable enemies, yet our growing under-
standing of their operations and the psychology of their recruitment and retention efforts, poli-
cies makers can now develop more effective counterterrorism methodologies. 
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